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Abstract
Background: Psychopathology research is changing focus from group-based “disease models” to a personalized
approach inspired by complex systems theories. This approach, which has already produced novel and valuable
insights into the complex nature of psychopathology, often relies on repeated self-ratings of individual patients. So
far, it has been unknown whether such self-ratings, the presumed observables of the individual patient as a
complex system, actually display complex dynamics. We examine this basic assumption of a complex systems
approach to psychopathology by testing repeated self-ratings for three markers of complexity: memory, the
presence of (time-varying) short- and long-range temporal correlations; regime shifts, transitions between different
dynamic regimes; and sensitive dependence on initial conditions, also known as the “butterfly effect,” the divergence
of initially similar trajectories.
Methods: We analyzed repeated self-ratings (1476 time points) from a single patient for the three markers of
complexity using Bartels rank test, (partial) autocorrelation functions, time-varying autoregression, a non-stationarity
test, change point analysis, and the Sugihara-May algorithm.
Results: Self-ratings concerning psychological states (e.g., the item “I feel down”) exhibited all complexity markers:
time-varying short- and long-term memory, multiple regime shifts, and sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
Unexpectedly, self-ratings concerning physical sensations (e.g., the item “I am hungry”) exhibited less complex
dynamics and their behavior was more similar to random variables.
Conclusions: Psychological self-ratings display complex dynamics. The presence of complexity in repeated self-
ratings means that we have to acknowledge that (1) repeated self-ratings yield a complex pattern of data and not a
set of (nearly) independent data points, (2) humans are “moving targets” whose self-ratings display non-stationary
change processes including regime shifts, and (3) long-term prediction of individual trajectories may be
fundamentally impossible. These findings point to a limitation of popular statistical time series models whose
assumptions are violated by the presence of these complexity markers. We conclude that a complex systems
approach to mental health should appreciate complexity as a fundamental aspect of psychopathology research by
adopting the models and methods of complexity science. Promising first steps in this direction, such as research on
real-time process monitoring, short-term prediction, and just-in-time interventions, are discussed.
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Background
Complex systems approaches to mental health study psy-
chopathology as a self-organized state emerging out of
interdependent cognitive, affective, behavioral, and physio-
logical processes [1–3]. This line of research has unargu-
ably produced innovative and valuable insights into
psychopathology, yet its most basic testable prediction has
almost never been investigated: Do the observables of this
complex system, i.e., psychological self-ratings, actually
display complex dynamics? This is an important question
to resolve, as it directly affects the veracity of the claim
that psychopathology should be regarded as a complex
system state. In the present study, we address this ques-
tion by identifying characteristic markers of complexity in
the dynamics of psychological observables as measured by
repeated self-ratings of social, emotional, physiological,
psychological, and behavioral states.
Recently, the mental health field is changing focus
from group-based “disease models” to more personalized
models of psychopathology. Group-based disease models
view mental disorders as conditions in which a specific
(biological or psychological) root cause leads to a set of
observable symptoms [3]. In this view, knowledge about
a population (e.g., people diagnosed with depression)
can (at least to some extent) be generalized to an indi-
vidual from that population. This assumption, however,
does not hold when a population is heterogeneous (e.g.,
[4, 5]) or when processes are non-stationary (for ex-
ample, when an individual’s mood is not stable over
time) as is often the case in human sciences [6–9]. Be-
cause of the heterogeneity between patients and the in-
trinsic non-stationarity of clinical change processes,
evidence-based practice guidelines based on group-level
comparisons are only of limited use for the care of indi-
vidual patients [10]. This is why scholars have called for
a personalized approach to psychopathology, in which
treatment is tailored to the specifics of the individual pa-
tient [11–14].
Recent advancements on the personalized approach to
psychopathology pledge for a complex systems perspec-
tive on mental health [14–17]. This perspective has
adopted metaphors and concepts from complexity sci-
ence, a transdisciplinary research area originated in
physics, mathematics, and biology [18–20]. The methods
and analytic techniques of complexity science, however,
are less commonly used in psychopathology research, al-
though they have been used to study human behavior in
the past [21–25]. Recent reviews of idiographic models
and methods for psychopathology research did not in-
clude any of the available complexity methods [14, 26].
There thus appears to be a discrepancy between the as-
sumed nature of the object under study (i.e., psycho-
pathology as a state in a complex dynamical system) and
the way it is scientifically studied.
In a complex dynamical system, the interdependencies
between parts lead to the emergence of robust ordered
states, or, patterns, at the level of the whole (see also
[27, 28]). These patterns may function as attractors to
the system, meaning that the system tends to maintain
its current pattern despite perturbations from the in-
ternal or external environment (i.e., the system is
attracted to a specific state). Several authors have pro-
posed that psychopathological states function as attrac-
tors in a complex system comprising an individual in its
environment [1, 2]. Such psychopathological attractors
may be very entrenched, meaning that a patient is
“stuck” in a particular state. The stability of attractors,
however, can change over time, in which case alternative
attractors become available to the system (i.e., multi-
stability). Clinical improvement is then conceptualized
as a so-called phase transition from a psychopathological
towards a more healthy attractor state, while the onset
of psychopathology is understood as the reverse. Recur-
rent depressive episodes may then for example be under-
stood as phase transitions between a depressed and a
healthy attractor.
Attractor states emerge through a process of self-
organization: the direct interactions between the system
parts with the internal or external environment (i.e., states
emerge without a blueprint or latent cause [29, 30]). From
a complex systems perspective, psychopathology is thus
not a fixed condition with a root cause. Instead, it is a
“soft-assembled,” self-organized, attractor state that arises
out of—and is maintained by—the interactions between
various component processes (e.g., biological, psycho-
logical, socio-cultural processes) whose dynamics evolve
on different temporal and spatial scales. The complex sys-
tems approach to psychopathology provides a set of de-
scriptive principles (e.g., attractors, feedback loops, self-
organization) that are assumed to apply to all psycho-
pathological states, while acknowledging that the content
of these states (e.g., in terms of symptom profiles [4]) is
highly individual and context specific as it has emerged
from a unique history of interaction events. A complex
systems approach thus naturally combines nomothetic
and idiographic aspects of psychopathology [2].
Probably due to their intuitive appeal, complex sys-
tems concepts, such as attractors, have since long been
around in clinical psychology [31–33]. These concepts,
however, have mostly been used metaphorically and not
literally in the form of complexity analysis of time series
data (but see for early applications [34–36]). This is
probably due to the fact that complexity science’s ana-
lytic toolbox has been relatively unknown to clinical re-
searchers. In addition, these analyses require data not
commonly collected in clinical research: time series data.
A time series is a record of intensive longitudinal mea-
surements of a variable, which describes the temporal
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evolution of an observable of a specific system. Typically,
complexity analyses require time series with many meas-
urement points, which are easily collected for physio-
logical signals (e.g., heart rate), but traditionally not for
psychological signals (e.g., the evolution of mood over
time [37]). The rise of smartphones now make it possible
to collect multivariate time series of such psychological
signals, using methods like ecological momentary assess-
ment (EMA) or experience sampling [38]. Also, advances
on complexity analysis have led to methods that can be
applied to relatively short time series as well (e.g., [39]).
Thus, the complex systems approach to psychopathology
is at a cusp to move beyond metaphors and to build a
genuine complexity science of personalized psychopath-
ology. The first step in this direction is to test whether
time series of psychological self-ratings indeed exhibit
characteristics of the dynamics of complex systems.
To answer this question, the present study will assess
the presence of three characteristics of complex systems
and their corresponding markers in time series data of
psychological variables (see Table 1). First, complex sys-
tems develop over time and thus have memory. This
means that the current state of a system depends on previ-
ous states. Rather than producing independent random
fluctuations, observed values generated by a complex sys-
tem are interdependent. Characteristic for complex self-
organizing systems (such as humans) is that their memory
is not limited to a short time scale (e.g., lag 1 or lag 2), but
can in principle span any lag of time. Thus, long-term
memory, identifiable as long-range temporal correlations
and power-law scaling, is expected in the time series of a
complex system as a sign of self-organized interactions
across scales as has been evidenced in time series of hu-
man physiology and performance [40–43]. In a pioneering
study, Delignières, Fortes, and Ninot [44] also found
power-law scaling in bi-daily self-ratings of self-esteem
and physical self-image. Moreover, temporal correlations
are expected to be non-stationary (i.e., time-varying) in
complex systems, which is considered the strongest evi-
dence for multiplicative interactions across different tem-
poral scales [45].
Second, complex systems exhibit phase transitions be-
tween attractor states: qualitative changes in the state of
the system that are reflected in time series as regime
shifts and non-stationarity [23, 46]. Different regimes
refer to different attractors (e.g., a state of psychopath-
ology and a state of health) and may be characterized by
different mean levels (e.g., of symptom severity), differ-
ent variance levels (e.g., emotional inertia vs. mood
swings), or differences in any other distributional charac-
teristic. Complexity theory predicts that phase transi-
tions from one attractor to another are preceded by a
period of instability, which comes apparent as a tempor-
ary increase of variability and complexity in time series
data, thereby providing another source of non-
stationarity [39, 47]. The study of these regime shifts, or
broader defined, phase transitions, is an important av-
enue for clinical science. Scholars have argued that many
important clinical events such as the onset of psychopath-
ology [48], relapse [49], suicide attempts [50], clinical im-
provement [51–57] and clinical deterioration [51, 52] may
be instances of phase transitions. Also, the instability that
precedes such transitions can be detected as so-called
early-warning signals (EWS) that may be used for short-
term prediction of clinical change [55, 58].
Third, complex systems can show a sensitive dependence
on initial conditions, which leads to a limited predictive
horizon [59, 60]. This means that it is possible to predict
time series of a complex system a few time points ahead,
but not in the far future. The predictive horizon of a time
series can therefore be useful to distinguish complex sys-
tems (strong prediction decay) from random systems
(which are never predictable) and simple deterministic sys-
tems (which are always predictable). A well-known example
of a complex system with a limited predictive horizon is the
weather. Short-term prediction is possible, but prediction
becomes highly unreliable after a few days. A clinical ex-
ample is provided by Tschacher et al. [35], who found that
the evolution of schizophrenia symptoms for many patients
in their study sample was predictable only in the short
term, but not in the long term (see also [34, 61, 62]).
The present study examines whether self-ratings col-
lected with EMA exhibit the three signs of complexity
introduced above: (1) time-varying short- and long-term
memory, (2) regime shifts, and (3) sensitive dependence on
initial conditions. We analyzed the presence of these
complexity markers in a single-case dataset with long EMA
time series (1476 time points) as a proof-of-principle.
Table 1 Characteristics of complex systems with corresponding markers and test procedures
Characteristic of complex system Marker Test
Memory • Dependency on past values
• Long-range temporal correlations
• Non-stationary temporal correlations
• Bartels rank test
• Inspect (partial) autocorrelation functions
• Time-varying autoregressive model
Regime shifts • Non-stationarity • KPSS test for level stationary time series
• Nonparametric change point analysis
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions • Limited predictive horizon • Forecast skill (Sugihara-May algorithm)
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Methods
Dataset
Publicly available EMA data from the study “Critical
Slowing Down as a Personalized Early Warning Signal
for Depression” were analyzed [63, 64]. The dataset con-
tains 1476 self-ratings over 239 consecutive days from a
single individual. Data were collected during a double-
blind experiment in which the participant reduced his
dosage of anti-depressant medication. Twenty-nine
items on momentary states of affect, symptoms, self-
esteem, and physical sensations were rated on Likert and
bipolar scales (ranging from 1 to 7 or from − 3 to + 3;
items in Table 2). This was done multiple times per day
during a baseline period, a period of dosage reduction,
and after the dosage reduction. On average, the partici-
pant completed 6.2 (SD = 1.9) assessments per day. In
addition, there were daily measures in the morning and
evening regarding sleep and evaluation of the day, re-
spectively. For a complete description of the dataset, see
[63]. In the present study, we analyzed the twenty-nine
items on momentary states. The time series of these
items have 1476 observations per item. In total, 103
observations were missing, which is less than 1% of all
observations (0.24%). The present dataset was chosen
because of the long time series, which are necessary for
several analysis techniques employed.
Data analysis
The time series were analyzed for markers of complexity
using the methods and tests listed in Table 1. This was
done twice: once for the full measurement period and
once for the “baseline period” only, consisting of 292 as-
sessments that were completed when the participant was
not yet tapering medication. We analyzed the baseline
period separately in order to examine to what extent the
complexity markers were present when clinical change
(relapse into depression) was presumably absent. Data
analysis of both measurement periods was done with
missing data excluded and with missing data imputed by
a multivariate imputation algorithm using chained equa-
tions [65]. Results were highly similar, likely because of
the low number of missing values. We report here on
the analysis with missing observations excluded. Each
marker was calculated for each time series separately.
When a statistical test was used, we corrected for mul-
tiple testing with Bonferroni correction by dividing the
conventional alpha level of .05 by the amount of items
tested and rounding to 3 decimals. A result was there-
fore considered significant when p < .002. All analyses
were performed in R [66]. The materials to reproduce
the present analysis are available at the open science
framework (https://osf.io/nca2u/). We elaborate on the




Memory in its most general form is reflected in time
series as dependence on past values. Statistically, this
means that time series generated by a complex system
are non-random. We tested for randomness using Bar-
tels rank test. In both the full measurement period and
the baseline period, ~ 85% of the items were shown to
be non-random (Table 2). The results showed that all
measures of psychological variables were non-random.
In contrast, for several measures of physical sensations,
such as the item “I am hungry,” the null hypothesis of
randomness was not rejected.
Long-range temporal correlations
We studied long-term memory by inspecting long-range
temporal correlations. We plotted the autocorrelation
function (ACF) for each item. The ACF shows the cor-
relation of a time series with a lagged version of itself.
The ACF can be visualized by plotting the correlation
strength against the lag size (see Fig. 1 for an example;
ACF plots for all items are available online at the open
science framework). Visual inspection of the ACFs
shows that both short-term (e.g., lag 1, lag 2) and long-
term memory are common in the present time series.
There are, however, considerable differences in ACFs be-
tween items. For example, in Fig. 1, the ACF for a typical
psychological variable (“I feel down”) can be compared
to the ACF for “I am hungry.” While “I feel down” shows
both short-term and long-term memory, “I am hungry”
shows little short-term memory and no clear pattern of
long-term correlations. To summarize the presence of
long-term memory, we calculated the number of lags
with significant partial autocorrelations per item (i.e.,
correlation estimates at higher lags are corrected for
autocorrelation at lower lags). The partial autocorrel-
ation function was calculated with the function pacf() as
implemented in the stats package of R [66]. The signifi-
cance threshold was based on a two-tailed Z test with
the time series length as number of observations. Results
showed that all items had significant partial autocorrela-
tions (Table 2). For each item, significant partial auto-
correlations were also found at very high lags (i.e., > lag
200; Table 2).
Non-stationary temporal correlations
We tested non-stationarity in the lag 1 autocorrelation
with a time-varying autoregressive (TV-AR) model,
using the R-package MGCV [67]. The TV-AR model
uses nonparametric smooth functions to model time-
varying autoregressive coefficients at specific lags.
We examined a TV-AR model for lag 1, because it
is the most examined lag in EMA research and
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often shows the strongest autocorrelation (e.g., [68]).
Non-stationarity of the lag 1 autocorrelation was evaluated
by the significance test of the TV-AR (which tests whether
the smoothing time-varying function is different from
zero) and the effective degrees of freedom (EDF) of the
smoothing function. The EDF indicates the number of
parameters needed to represent the smoothing function
[69]. An EDF of 2 indicates a linear trend of autocorrel-
ation over time, which can either mean that the autocor-
relation is not changing or changing linearly. An EDF
higher than 2 indicates that the autocorrelation is defin-
itely non-stationary. The results show that the lag 1 auto-
correlation is often non-stationary (Table 2). Visual
inspection of the fit of the TV-AR model shows that items










EDF of TV-AR KPSS test
H0 = level
stationary




Item Mean SD All data Subset N Max lag All data Subset All data Subset All
data
Subset
I feel relaxed 4.17 0.75 < .001* < .001* 17 932 3.36* 8.35* .097 .029 5 2
I feel down 3.18 0.74 < .001* < .001* 27 402 2.00* 2.00* .010* .100 5 0
I feel irritated 2.24 1.17 < .001* < .001* 19 667 3.28* 2.00* .010* .050 1 0
I feel satisfied 4.2 0.99 < .001* < .001* 17 478 9.40* 3.06* .100 .012 2 0
I feel lonely 3.01 0.49 < .001* < .001* 19 606 9.14* 2.00 .010* .089 1 0
I feel anxious 3.09 0.31 < .001* < .001* 29 594 8.95* 4.53* .010* .100 2 0
I feel enthusiastic 3.83 0.86 < .001* < .001* 16 379 2.00* 2.50* .100 .090 0 0
I feel suspicious 1.26 0.55 < .001* < .001* 31 405 9.17* 2.94 .010* .052 7 0
I feel cheerful 4.09 0.84 < .001* < .001* 24 406 2.00* 3.05* .100 .043 6 0
I feel guilty 3.01 0.46 < .001* < .001* 19 886 9.50* 2.58 .010* .010* 6 1
I feel indecisive 1.85 0.87 < .001* < .001* 25 750 2.79* 2.00* .100 .010* 11 1
I feel strong 4 0.87 < .001* < .001* 24 826 4.38* 2.00* .100 .019 8 0
I feel restless 2.04 0.93 < .001* < .001* 24 617 9.72* 5.75* .010* .050 5 0
I feel agitated 2.13 0.98 < .001* < .001* 20 819 9.62* 2.00* .010* .045 5 0
I worry 1.34 0.84 < .001* < .001* 30 547 2.00* 2.00* .010* .089 2 0
I can concentrate well 4.37 0.72 < .001* < .001* 17 431 2.00* 2.66* .010* .010* 1 1
I like myself 4.66 0.57 < .001* < .001* 18 552 7.23* 2.51* .100 .010* 6 1
I am ashamed of myself 1.22 0.59 < .001* < .001* 19 716 2.00* 2.33 .010* .100 1 0
I doubt myself 1.99 0.92 < .001* < .001* 21 733 3.00* 2.00* .058 .100 8 0
I can handle anything 3.94 0.79 < .001* < .001* 19 466 2.00* 2.33 .064 .043 1 0
I am hungry 1.46 0.73 .068 .068 13 484 3.40* 4.37 .010* .014 0 0
I am tired 2.01 0.82 < .001* < .001* 23 668 9.75* 2.91 .010* .100 5 0
I am in pain 1.34 0.53 < .001* < .001* 14 571 9.14* 3.04 .100 .027 2 0
I feel dizzy 1.01 0.08 .854 24 858 3.03 .010* 0
I have a dry mouth 1 0.04 .958 18 702 3.59 .029 0
I feel nauseous 1.01 0.08 .854 21 942 2.00 .100 0
I have a headache 1.43 0.65 < .001* .854 19 710 8.49* 8.35 .022 .010* 9 1
I am sleepy 1.45 1.01 < .001* .958 16 241 6.99* 2.00 .010* .016 1 0
From the last beep onwards I was physically
active
1.94 0.93 < .001* .854 16 685 3.37* 2.00 .010* .100 1 0












N number. N = 1476 for all data. N = 292 for the subset. *Statistically significant test statistics (p < .002). Descriptive statistics were calculated with all ratings scaled
to a range from 1 to 7. For Bartels rank test, results were considered significant for p < .002. The KPSS test only provides p values between .010 and .100. For the
KPSS test, p = .010 was therefore considered significant. Three items showed no variance during the baseline period included in the subset and were therefore
omitted from analysis of the subset
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with an EDF of 2 often had a non-stationary (increasing or
decreasing) lag 1 autocorrelation as well (see supplemental
figures TV-AR available at the open science framework).
The autocorrelation function can also be non-stationary at
different lags than 1. We explored this visually by plotting
the autocorrelation function in a moving window of 492
time points. These plots show that the autocorrelation
function is often non-stationary at many different lags (see
Fig. 2 for an example; moving window ACF plots for all
items are available online at the open science framework).
We also visualized the variation of autocorrelation coeffi-
cients per lag (see Fig. 3 for an example; visualizations for
all items are available online at the open science
framework).
Regime shifts
Phase transitions can be reflected in time series data as re-
gime shifts: distributional changes in the time series in-
cluding changes in mean and variance. Statistically, this
leads to non-stationarity. We tested the hypothesis that
time series could be seen as stationary around a level
using the KPSS test as available in the R-package tseries
[70]. The alternative hypothesis of the test is the presence
of a unit root: a systematic unpredictable pattern,
indicating non-stationarity. Results are presented in
Table 2. Non-stationarity was found in many items when
tested over the whole measurement period and in few
items for the baseline period. Additionally, we estimated
the number of regime shifts with a change point analysis,
specifically the e.divisive algorithm, available in the R-
package epc [71], which identifies significant changes in
the distribution of data points over time. E.divisive com-
pares all possible data segments and tests significance dif-
ferences using a permutation test. The results show that
many items have multiple change points, especially when
the full measurement period is considered. In the baseline
period, one can see largely converging results from the
non-stationarity test and the change point analysis.
Visual inspection of the results from the change point
analysis suggests a relation between regime shifts in the
time series of some items and the transition towards a
depressive episode that the participant experienced. This
is clearly illustrated for the item “I feel down” (Fig. 4)
that was also found to be non-stationary (Table 1). One
can see that the transition towards depression (Fig. 4;
red line) is preceded by a period of instability in the time
series, in which the item “I feel down” flickers between
two regimes, one associated with lower scores and one
Fig. 1 Autocorrelation functions and partial autocorrelation functions of the items “I feel down” and “I am hungry.” The red line indicates
significance threshold with p < .05
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with higher scores. After the transition towards the de-
pressive episode, the time series settles in the regime
with higher scores. Notably, the time series of the other
items sometimes show regime shifts that seem related to
the transition towards depression (as in Fig. 4), but there
are also many regime shifts during presumably more
stable periods in the participant’s mental state (figures of
change points for all items are available online at the
open science framework).
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions means that an
extremely small difference between two trajectories at
present can lead to dramatically large differences in the fu-
ture, i.e., a divergence of trajectories. This divergence is
the result of nonlinearity, a property that is typical for
complex systems. As a consequence of sensitive depend-
ence on initial conditions, complex systems tend to pro-
duce trajectories that are predictable only on the short
term. Predictability can therefore be used to distinguish
between different types of systems. Random systems have
no predictability at all, simple deterministic systems (e.g.,
a sine wave) are perfectly predictable both short and long
term. Complex systems lie in between these extremes: the
predictability of their trajectory quickly decays over time.
Phase space reconstruction
As a measure of predictability, we computed forecast skill
using the procedure proposed by Sugihara and May [72]
using the R-package rEDM [73]. First, time series are em-
bedded in a reconstructed phase space in which time-
lagged copies of the time series are used as dimensions.
The method of phase space reconstruction is based on
Taken’s theorem [74]. This theorem entails that, under a
limited set of assumptions, the state space dynamics of the
system as a whole can be retrieved (under topological
equivalence) from the observation of a single dimension of
its state space: As long as the dimensions of the state
space of a multidimensional dynamic system can be repre-
sented by coupled interdependent processes, its behavior
can be reconstructed from a time series of only one ob-
servable dimension of that system. The state evolution of
the system can be thought of as a trajectory through its
state space. This trajectory is predicted by the Sugihara-
May algorithm. The algorithm also imputed the few
missing observations, as part of this specific analysis.
Fig. 2 Three autocorrelation functions of the item “I feel down” calculated in a non-overlapping moving window of size 492
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Procedure
The data were split in two parts. From the first 700 data
points, the trajectory of each item in its reconstructed
phase space was used to predict the trajectory of each item
in a reconstructed phase space of the remaining measure-
ment period. To create time-lagged copies of the time
series as surrogate dimensions, we used a time lag of 4,
which was the median optimal time lag for all items. The
determination of the time lag is an optimization proced-
ure, but in principle, every time lag will do. We used 13
dimensions in the embedding procedure, as this was the
maximum optimal embedding dimension for all items.
Too few dimensions is problematic, because it can lead to
false identifications of similar trajectories [75]. It is not
problematic to have too many dimensions. A measure of
predictability, forecast skill, is then computed as the Pear-
son correlation between values that are predicted by the
Sugihara-May algorithm and the observed values.
Forecast skill
Forecast skill was compared at different time lags. A de-
crease in predictability over time lags is called a prediction
decay. As a measure of prediction decay, we computed the
slope of forecast skill over time within the first 5 lags
(which was for most items a linear area in the forecast skill
plots; see all forecast skill plots online at the open science
framework). Our results show that for almost all items,
forecast skill decreased over time (Fig. 5). However, there
were interesting differences between items. Psychological
items tended to show a clear decrease in predictability over
time, suggesting that these time series indeed present the
dynamics of a complex system. Items related to physical
sensations, such as the item “I am hungry,” however, tended
to show very low predictability both short and long term,
suggesting that these time series are random. In Fig. 6, fore-
cast skill is plotted against time for a typical affect item, a
typical physical item, a sine wave, and random uniform
noise. One can see that the predictability of “I feel down”
decreases rapidly over time, as is expected for time series
generated by complex systems. In contrast, “I am hungry”
is never predictable and behaves as a random variable.
Discussion
The present study examined whether the dynamics of
repeated self-ratings are complex dynamics. We analyzed
long psychological time series collected with EMA for
three markers of complexity: (time-varying) short- and
long-term memory, regime shifts, and sensitive depend-
ence on initial conditions. Results showed that the
present self-ratings were indeed complex: almost all
items exhibited clear evidence for the three markers.
First, we found that the analyzed time series possessed
memory: current values depended on past values. This was
not restricted to short-term memory in the form of a
Fig. 3 Median autocorrelation (points) with range between 25th and 75th quantile (lines) by lag for the item “I feel down.” Autocorrelation
functions were computed in 985 overlapping moving windows of size 492
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dependency on a previous assessment from hours or a day
ago (e.g., lag 1, lag 2). Current values also correlated with
values in the distant past that were assessed weeks or
months ago (e.g., lag 200, lag 1000). These long-range tem-
poral correlations are indicative of interactions across scales
and self-organization in complex systems [43, 45]. Long-
range temporal correlations can be understood as slow
“waves” that are reflected by the time series [45, 76]. The
present results align with the ever growing empirical record
of studies that have evidenced the presence and characteris-
tics of long-range correlations and fractal scaling (i.e., a spe-
cific pattern of long-range correlations associated with self-
organization [42]) in time and trial series of human physi-
ology and performance [40–44, 77–86]. Moreover, the
temporal correlations changed over time, indicating multi-
fractality, which is considered a strong indicator for multi-
plicative interactions across time scales as data-generating
process [45]. In sum, these results go against the notion
that repeated self-ratings are a collection of independent,
memoryless [87], observations. Instead, repeated self-
ratings exhibit complex temporal patterns yielding time-
varying short- and long-term memory.
Second, about half of the time series were non-
stationary and many time series exhibited multiple
change points, indicating the presence of regime shifts.
This reflects the occurrence of phase transitions: qualita-
tive shifts from one attractor state to another. In the
current dataset, the relapse of the participant towards a
depressive state was an example of such a phase transi-
tion, which was related to a regime shift in weekly symp-
tom scores in a previous study [64]. This phase
transition has also led to non-stationarity and change
points in EMA items (e.g., Fig. 4). Change point analysis
showed, however, that many items had more than one
change point, suggesting that multiple phase transitions
occurred in the specific psychological processes that
were measured with EMA (e.g., the flickering ob-
served in Fig. 4). When stationarity and change points
were only examined during the baseline period of the ex-
periment in which medication was not yet being tapered,
only few items showed evidence for regime shifts.
Third, the time series showed a limited predictive hori-
zon, signaling the sensitive dependence on initial condi-
tions that is typical for complex systems. The predictive
Fig. 4 Change point analysis for the item “I feel down.” Blue vertical lines indicate change points in the time series. The red vertical line indicates
measurement point 825, corresponding to day 127 around which the transition towards depression was identified in the weekly symptom
measures [64]
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horizon seemed to be limited to about 3 to 5 time points.
The observed prediction decay indicates the presence of a
butterfly effect: the trajectories of once closely located data
points completely diverge over time. Thus, while short-
term prediction of these repeated self-ratings is possible,
these results suggest that long-term prediction may be
fundamentally impossible. In the current analysis, trajec-
tories were compared within the time series of the same
person, but the butterfly effect applies equally well to tra-
jectories of different persons. In a recent study by Rubel
et al. [88], process-outcome relations in psychotherapy
could not be reliably predicted on the basis of process-
outcome relations from patients with highly similar pre-
treatment characteristics. A finding which may be ex-
plained by the presence of a butterfly effect (i.e., individual
trajectories diverge over time; see also [61, 62]).
One interesting and unexpected result was the difference
between self-ratings of psychological states and physical
sensations in the presence and strength of markers of com-
plexity. All psychological states, such as “I feel down,” were
found to be non-random in both the full dataset and the
subset. In contrast, for physical sensations, such as “I am
hungry,” the null hypothesis of randomness was often not
rejected, at least not in the subset. Moreover, when looking
at the predictive horizon in the forecast skill graphs, the
psychological states all showed the typical prediction decay
that characterizes complex systems, while the physical sen-
sations showed a prediction horizon that more closely
resembles that of a random variable. Physical sensations,
such as hungriness, are of course not truly random pro-
cesses. This result should thus be explained either by the
appropriateness of the sampling rate in this study for the
different variables or by the nature of the variables them-
selves (e.g., “I am hungry” may refer to an unambiguous
identifiable internal state that can be thought of as being
experienced at different orders of magnitude, “I feel suspi-
cious,” much less so, see also [89]). Either way, the striking
difference between the two types of items may be an im-
portant avenue for future research, with the potential to
shed more light on the nature of psychological
measurement.
In sum, the present study corroborates the assumption
that self-ratings of psychological states display complex
behavior and support the proposal that a complex sys-
tems approach to psychopathology is warranted [1–3,
90, 91]. The present study is limited to a single case with
long time series, which enabled us to thoroughly examine
the dynamics and assess multiple markers with multiple
techniques. The single-case design, however, can by defin-
ition not be used to estimate the frequency of a
phenomenon (in this case how many individuals will ex-
hibit complex behavior in their psychological dynamics).
Rather, the single-case study shows the existence of a
phenomenon. Thus, the results primarily indicate that com-
plexity in psychological dynamics should be considered.
However, given the strong theoretical arguments for humans
Fig. 5 Slopes of forecast skill over time. Values indicate how strong the forecast skill decreases in 1 time step, calculated over the first five time steps
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to be complex (and not random or simple deterministic) sys-
tems [28] and the omnipresence of complexity in other
human-generated time series [43], we judge it unlikely that
the complexity in the present dataset is a coincidence. In-
stead, the present results can be seen as illustrating the need
for a complex systems approach to psychopathology that
moves beyond metaphors and appreciates the scientific and
clinical implications of complexity.
Scientific implications
First, the presence of both short- and long-term memory
has methodological implications. Widely applied statis-
tical time series models of psychological dynamics, i.e.,
autoregressive (AR) models, do often not account for
long-term memory [14, 26]. In these models, the current
value of a variable is typically predicted by values in the
near past (usually lag 1, or lag 2; e.g., [68]), but not in
the distant past. Not taking into account long-range
temporal correlations can “completely invalidate statis-
tical inference” [92]. However, taking these long-range
temporal correlations into account in a statistical model
is far from straightforward. In the current study, we
found for many items significant partial autocorrelations
in as much as 20 different lags. In an AR model, these
would be modeled as 20 independent, additive processes
that influence the current state of the system. In other
areas of psychological science, there is much debate
about whether this is a sensible model to describe a time
series [45, 93–95]. Proponents of AR models argue that
the different autocorrelations represent distinct additive
causal processes [95]. Complexity scientists argue that
they do not, and propose the presence of long-range
correlations to be a consequence of self-organized inter-
actions between interdependent (i.e., non-additive)
causal processes at different temporal scales [96]. The
latter argument is supported by the fact that long-range
correlations are ubiquitous in nature, even when distinct
additive causal processes are clearly absent (e.g., self-
organization in a pile of sand [41]). Moreover, data with
non-stationary autocorrelation functions, as we ob-
served, cannot be generated by the most flexible AR
model (i.e., the autoregressive fractally integrated moving
average model [97]), but can be generated by models
that feature interaction across scales (i.e., cascade models
[45]). Thus, following a complex systems perspective
that embraces self-organization as the causal mechan-
ism, statistical models of time series can only be used
Fig. 6 Forecast skill over time plotted for the items “I feel down” (upper left), “I am hungry” (lower left), a sine wave (upper right), and random
uniform noise (lower right). The item “I feel down” shows a limited predictive horizon with a strong prediction decay that is characteristic for
complex systems. The contrast is clearly seen with a completely predictable system (the sine wave) and a completely random system (the
random uniform noise). The item “I am hungry” shows a prediction decay that more closely resembles a random system than a complex system
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descriptively and not as formal models of the underlying
causal processes (see also [98]).
Vector autoregressive (VAR) models are time series
models that include multiple variables that may predict
themselves and each other at specific lags (often re-
stricted to lag 1 in psychopathology research). VAR
models are used to examine Granger causality [99].
Granger causality entails that if a variable X at one time
point predicts a variable Y at a future time point beyond
the autoregressive effect of Y (how Y predicts itself), X
can be said to be Granger causal for Y. Although re-
searchers using VAR models are careful in interpreting
their models in causal terms, the general idea of these
models is that they at least can give a hint of possible
causal relations. Accordingly, variables that are Granger
causal for many other variables are suggested as targets
for treatment (e.g., [68]). This reasoning, however, is
problematic under conditions of complexity. Due to the
presence of short- and long-term memory, time series
are not stochastic beyond what is typically modeled by
the VAR model, meaning that Granger causality does
not apply [99]. Sugihara et al. [100] illustrate that the
(lagged) correlations between variables in a complex
(eco)system are indeed bad indicators for causality. Two
variables that have a stable causal connection in a com-
plex system may exhibit non-stationary correlation with
each other, even to the point that the correlation coeffi-
cient switch signs [100]. In a simulation study on
psychological dynamics, Haslbeck and Ryan [101] found
that a VAR model cannot retrieve the complex systems
model that generated the data. Sugihara et al. [100]
propose convergent cross mapping as a possible alterna-
tive for Granger causality. Also, recurrence-based ana-
lysis, which requires no assumptions concerning the
structure of the data, may be a promising approach to
investigate the dynamics of EMA data [89, 102, 103].
Future research should further examine these techniques
for psychological self-ratings.
Second, complex systems exhibit phase transitions,
which lead to regime shifts and thus non-stationarity in
time series data. While regime shifts are generally un-
desirable in statistical approaches to psychological dy-
namics [26], they are an important research avenue in a
complex systems approach. In the dynamic research
strategy outlined by Thelen and Ulrich [23], phase tran-
sitions form the starting point for the study of develop-
mental and also clinical change.
 First, phase transitions differentiate between
different attractor states that demand their own
descriptions. For example, a depressed attractor
state may yield a specific pattern of cognition,
emotion, behavior, and physiology that is reflected
in specific values of such variables (e.g., high
negative emotions, high rumination) as well as the
interrelations between them (e.g., a feedback loop
between negative thoughts and negative feelings). A
healthy attractor of the same person may in contrast
be characterized by completely different values and
interrelations of these variables [1]. Aggregation of a
time series over different regimes should thus be
avoided as this will give a misleading impression of
the patient’s actual psychological states (e.g.,
emotions may appear neutral on average, while the
patient actually experienced one period of negative
emotions and one period of positive emotions).
Future research should therefore explicitly examine
possible different attractor states in time series (for
example with change point analysis).
 A second research avenue is the study of early-
warning signals (EWS) as precursors of upcoming
phase transitions [104]. In a study on self-ratings
collected during psychotherapy, EWS were indeed
shown to be predictive for upcoming regime shifts
in symptom severity levels [52]. Such real-time pre-
diction of transitions may be highly relevant for pre-
vention and intervention in clinical practice. During
periods of EWS, complex systems are more sensitive
to external influences. Interventions, aimed at either
eliciting positive change (e.g., sudden gains [52];) or
preventing negative change (e.g., suicide attempts
[50];), may thus be increasingly effective during pe-
riods of destabilization (see also [105]). Future re-
search should test this hypothesis.
 A third reason to study phase transitions is that these
are the moments at which change mechanisms in
complex systems may be revealed [23, 106]. Consider
a simple example: the emergence of convection rolls
when boiling water. At a critical temperature, where
the body of water cannot dissipate its heat any more
in a regular fashion, convection rolls emerge
spontaneously. At the transition point, a change
mechanism (a control parameter in complex systems
terms) can be identified: the kinetic energy (i.e., heat)
that is delivered to the pan. This sounds obvious but
note that the heat may not have been identified as the
control parameter if the water was only observed
within a small temperature range that did not include
the critical threshold, or the tipping point. Control
parameters thus only become apparent as change
mechanisms at the tipping points of transition. From
this perspective, EMA research is thus especially
interesting during a change process (e.g., therapy) and
not during a baseline period in which the change
mechanisms are likely to remain hidden. In
psychopathology, control parameters will of course be
harder to identify than in the example of convection
rolls described above. Control parameters for clinical
Olthof et al. BMC Medicine          (2020) 18:317 Page 12 of 16
change are likely to be individual and contextualized.
This makes control parameters an interesting avenue
for applied idiographic research (for steps in this
direction, see [107–109]).
Third, complex systems show sensitive dependence on
initial conditions, which implies that psychological dy-
namics are predictable in the short term, but not in the
long term. For clinical science, this means that long-
term prediction of individual trajectories may be funda-
mentally impossible. Instead, researchers should aim at
short-term prediction and be careful in forecasting further
in the future as predictions will become increasingly unre-
liable. Short-term prediction is a promising future direc-
tion for intervention science, as it may enable just-in-time
interventions (e.g., [110]). It should be noted, however,
that advancements are made in deriving the governing
equations of complex systems from time series data, in
which case long-term prediction would in theory become
possible (e.g., [111]). Future research could explore the
possibility to derive such equations from EMA data.
Clinical implications
If we accept the three markers and their meaning in
complex systems theories as fundamental aspects of psy-
chopathology and clinical change, this has several impli-
cations for clinical practice and public health. Note that,
in contrast to the scientific implications given above,
these implications are more on a conceptual level, rather
than a data level, and therefore arguably more specula-
tive. Our primary aim is to illustrate how the clinical
implications of a complex systems approach, as we and
others have proposed elsewhere [1, 2, 90, 91], relate to
the three characteristics that we examined.
First, our findings regarding memory support the as-
sumption that psychopathology emerges from self-
organized interactions between processes at different tem-
poral scales [90]. Current psychopathology is then the re-
sult of a unique life-span history of interaction events,
which can explain why psychopathology is highly individu-
alized [4, 14]. For clinical practice, this implies that classifi-
cation is fundamentally limited for clinical case formulation
(although it may fulfill a practical function). Instead, per-
sonalized case conceptualization should be preferred [12].
Second, our findings regarding regime shifts support the
idea that clinical change represents a phase transition from
one attractor to another (e.g., a transition into a depressive
episode). Therapeutic change is then expected to be discon-
tinuous and irregular rather than continuous and gradual.
Also, this means that dose-response relations in psycho-
pathology will often be disproportional [112]: when a pa-
tient is in an entrenched psychopathological attractor,
interventions will have very little effect, but if a patient
is close to a tipping point, small interventions can have
enormous effects. The hypothesis that treatment is increas-
ingly effective during destabilization periods is an important
avenue for future research. The generic principles of thera-
peutic change by Schiepek et al. [2] and the network
destabilization and transition model by Hayes et al. [1] pro-
vide two (related) process-oriented frameworks for how
clinicians may support phase transitions towards clinical
improvement in psychotherapy. Central to these ap-
proaches is that treatment does not follow a strict protocol,
but is personalized to the dynamic state of the patient
(e.g., in a stable attractor or a destabilization period).
Third, as exemplified by sensitive dependence on ini-
tial conditions, we expect clinical change processes to
follow complex individual pathways that are very hard to
predict based on baseline characteristics, rather than
Table 3 Characteristics of complex systems with corresponding scientific and clinical implications
Characteristic
complex system
Scientific implications Clinical implications
Memory • Absence of long-range temporal correlations and stationarity of
temporal correlations cannot be assumed, but should be examined
• The data-generating process of EMA data is likely to involve inter-
actions across scales
• Future research should explore techniques that do not make
assumptions about the correlation structure of EMA data such as
recurrence analysis or convergent cross mapping
• Current psychopathology should be understood as
emergent from a life-span history of interaction events
• Patients’ specific psychopathological states are
fundamentally individualized
Regime shifts • Stationarity of mean and variance cannot be assumed, but
should be examined
• Different regimes in a time series demand their own description
• Future research should further study drivers and predictors of
phase transitions
• Enduring clinical improvement may be understood as a
phase transition
• Successful treatments are then characterized by a
destabilization period in which the patient’s psychological
state is more variable
• Interventions are hypothesized to be more effective




• Long-term prediction of psychological self-ratings may be funda-
mentally impossible
• Future research should focus on short-term prediction
• Frequent process monitoring is essential to track the
change process
• Few measurements may give a misleading impression of
the clinical change processes
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standard tracks [61]. On the individual level, clinical
change processes are highly irregular and fluctuating, as
comes apparent when enough measurements are taken.
Too few measurements (e.g., only pre and post) can then
be misleading, and frequent process monitoring (e.g.,
with daily self-ratings) is essential for a valid measure of
the change processes [113] (for an overview of all scien-
tific and clinical implications, see Table 3).
Outlook
Last, we propose two (complementary) directions for future
research: a nomothetic and an idiographic approach. First,
the nomothetic approach to psychopathology research
should aim at identifying and understanding general proper-
ties of clinical change based on the principles of complex
systems (e.g., phase transitions). These general principles
govern laws of within-system changes and thus cannot be
derived from traditional group-level research but by drawing
generalizations across cases, possibly in a multi-level frame-
work ([9]; e.g., [52]). Research questions in this approach are
as follows: how is destabilization related to clinical change?
Can we predict phase transitions? Are interventions more
effective during periods of destabilization?
Second, we propose an idiographic approach which,
informed by nomothetic research, should aim at study-
ing the manifestation of these general principles in single
individuals, thereby providing individualized and contex-
tualized content. Research questions in this approach
are as follows: what does the psychopathological state of
a patient entail? What feedback loops might play a role
in maintaining this state? What might be possible con-
trol parameters that drive a client to its tipping point to-
wards a more healthy psychological state? Such an
idiographic approach, informed by general principles,
provides an excellent starting point for applied clinical
research which may directly inform clinical decision-
making (for steps in this direction, see, e.g., [108, 110, 113]).
Conclusions
The present study illustrates that complexity should be
considered in the study of psychological self-ratings.
This finding highlights the need to adopt principles of
complex systems theory and methods into psychopath-
ology research. As an outlook, we envision a complexity
science of psychopathology that bridges the gap between
nomothetic and idiographic research and between science
and practice.
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